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MAXIMIZING THE FUTURE: THE CASE FOR MANDATING FRAUD PREVENTION TOOLS IN 
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SOFTWARE 
 
RYAN POTENTE1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades, the U.S. health care system has been plagued by inefficiencies that have 
contributed to the rising cost of health care.
2
 In 2011, the federal government spent an 
astounding $2.7 trillion dollars on health care.
3
  To put this figure in proper perspective, 
consider that, excluding the United States, only four countries in the entire world have a 
GDP that exceeds $2.7 trillion.
4
  In an effort to curb health care spending, and also 
promote better quality of care, the United States has made the move towards electronic 
health records (hereinafter “EHRs”).5 There is little doubt that EHRs represent the future 
of health care in the United States, but if that future is going to be bright, the federal 
government has to ensure that EHR systems do exacerbate the problem of health care 
fraud. 
6
 
                                                        
1 Seton Hall University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013. 
2 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. spent more on health care per 
capita, $7,146, and more on health care as percentage of its GDP, 15.2%, than any other nation in 
2008. World Health Organization, World Health Statistics: 2011,  http://www.who.int/gho/ 
publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS2011_Full.pdf 
3 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Projections 
2011-2021, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2011PDF.pdf.    
4 Trading Economics, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), List by Country, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/gdp-list-by-country. 
5  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) authorizes the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to award incentive payments for health care 
professionals who demonstrate ‘meaningful use’ of ‘certified’ EHR systems. In 2015, financial 
penalties are schedule to take effect for Medicare and Medicaid providers who do not transition to 
EHRs. See 42 C.F.R. 495.6l; 42 C.F.R 495; 42 C.F.R 102.  
6 Healthcare fraud is defined generally as an “intentional deception or misrepresentation that the 
individual or entity makes knowing that the misrepresentation could result in some unauthorized 
benefit to the individual, or the entity or to some other party.” National Health Care Anti-fraud 
Association. What is Healthcare Fraud?,  
www.nhcaa.org/about_health_care_fraud/Consumer_Information 
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EHR systems include certain timesaving software tools, such as copy and paste 
functions, that increase the efficiency of health care delivery. However, these very same 
software tools can be also be used to commit fraud faster and with greater ease than ever 
before.
7
 Unfortunately, the federal government and ONC
8
 have largely ignored this 
vexing issue.
9
 This point is perhaps most apparent after consideration of the “certification 
regulations,” which were adopted by the ONC in 2010 and set forth the required 
minimum capabilities of an EHR system.  Despite setting forth extensive functional 
requirements, there is not even one provision in the regulations that is specifically 
designed to prevent fraud.
10
  This paper will argue that, in order to avoid an increase in 
health care fraud, the certification regulations must be amended to include functional 
                                                        
7 See generally Lisa Eramo. Stopping Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the e-Health Era. 
Journal of AHIMA, March 2011, American Health Information Management Association, 
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_048698.hcsp?dDocName=
bok1_048698. 
8  The ONC, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, is 
organizationally located within the Office of HHS and “is the principal Federal entity charged 
with coordination of nationwide efforts to implement and use the most advanced health 
information technology and the electronic exchange of health information.” About ONC: The 
Office of the National Coordinator, HealthIT, May 5, 
2012,http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit_hhs_gov__onc/1200. 
9 Since 2009, the Obama Administration has held dozens of public meetings on electronic health 
record policies and standards, but none that focused primarily on fraud control. Fred Schulte, 
Billing Software Helps Medical Professionals Document Higher Fees, The Center for Public 
Integrity, September 19, 2012, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/19/10812/growth-
electronic-medical-records-eases-path-inflated-bills. See also Donald Simborg, There is No 
Neutral Position on Fraud, Journal of the American Informatics Association, July, 2011 
(discussing specific examples of how the leadership at the ONC has chosen not to be proactive 
with regard to fraud management.) 
10  “To date, federal meaningful use requirements do not include a fraud prevention component, 
and EHR certification related to the program thus does not require it.” Id.  See also 45 C.F.R 
170.302, 304,306 and 314 (hereinafter “the certification regulations provisions.”)  It is important 
to note that the certification regulations do contain some provisions that are helpful towards 
deterring fraud.  For example, 45 C.F.R. 170.302(o) requires each EHR system to “assign a 
unique name/and or tracking number for identifying and tracking user identity.” However, 
anything in the regulations helpful to preventing fraud is “limited to those which overlap with 
security and privacy concerns which motivated their inclusion.” Simborg, supra note 9. This 
paper takes the position that the certification regulations must include provisions that are 
specifically tailored  to the unique threats of fraud created by the use of EHR software tools in 
order to avoid an increase in health care fraud. 
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requirements that are specifically tailored to address the unique fraud threats caused by 
EHR systems (these functional requirements will hereinafter be referred to as “fraud 
prevention software tools.” ) 
 This paper is organized as follows: Part I discusses how EHR software can be 
used to increase the ease and speed of committing health care fraud, and presents data 
that suggests fraud has already increased as a result of unprotected EHR systems.
11
 Part II 
sets forth four policy reasons why this problem should be addressed in the certification 
regulations with fraud prevention software tools. Part III recommends specifics fraud 
prevention tools that should be included in the certification regulations. Finally, Part IV 
concludes this paper by addressing some likely criticisms to use of fraud software tools.  
I. UNSECURED EHR SYSTEMS INCREASE THE EASE & SPEED OF COMMITTING 
HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
 
In a recent New York Times article, Dr. David J. Brailer, former National 
Coordinator of the ONC, stated unequivocally the use of EHRs “makes it faster and 
easier to be fraudulent.”12 Dr. Brailer’s sentiment is hardly ground breaking. In fact, two 
separate reports commissioned by the federal government have reached the same 
conclusion.
13
 EHR systems increase the ease and speed of committing health care fraud 
primarily because they include software tools that make it exceedingly easy to create a 
                                                        
11 Healthcare fraud is defined as an “intentional deception or misrepresentation that the individual 
or entity makes knowing that the misrepresentation could result in some unauthorized benefit to 
the individual, or the entity or to some other party.” National Health Care Anti-fraud Association. 
What is Healthcare Fraud?,  www.nhcaa.org/about_health_care_fraud/Consumer_Information. 
12 Reed Albeson, Medicare Bills Rise as Records Turn Electronics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21 2012. 
13 “Without a deliberate effort to build fraud management into [electronic systems], healthcare 
payers and consumers will be exposed to new and potentially increased vulnerability to 
electronically enabled healthcare fraud.” Foundation of Research and Education of AHIMA, 
Report on the Use of Health Information Technology to Enhance and Expand Health Care Anti-
Fraud Activities, 13, September 30, 2005. See also, discussed extensively in Part III, RTI 
International, Recommended Requirements for Enhancing Data Quality in Electronic Health 
Records, May 2007, http://www.rti.org/pubs/enhancing_data_quality_in_ehrs.pdf.  
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false record of what occurred during a medical encounter.  Most commonly, the false 
record will be used to deliberately ‘bill for a service not rendered’ or provide the basis for 
‘upcoding.’14  These schemes already represent the two most popular forms of health care 
fraud
15
, and as such, any increase in their occurrence through the exploitation of EHR 
software is a grave concern. 
A few of the most frequently abused EHR tools include: (i) one-click notes, (ii) copy  
and paste features, and (iii) billing decision message prompts (hereinafter “message 
prompts.) Although one-click notes and copy and paste features function differently, they 
largely present the same problem in that they both increase the speed and ease of 
inserting false information into a medical record. One-click notes, as the name suggests, 
                                                        
14  ‘Billing for services not rendered’ is a scheme wherein a bill is deliberately submitted for 
payment even though no medical service was actually provided. ‘Upcoding,’ in contrast, is a 
scheme wherein the health care providers submits a bill using a procedure code that yields a 
higher payment than the code for the service that was truly rendered. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Financial Crimes Report to the Public: 2010-2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011. It is important to distinguish these two 
schemes, which are committed deliberately, with inadvertent errors in coding for which, 
according to the Wall Street Journal, “there are no comprehensive statistics.” Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, How to Fight a Bogus Bill, The Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2011. The paper’s 
focus is on those whom deliberately abuse EHR software tools to commit healthcare fraud faster 
and with greater ease.  
15 The specific percentage of fraud attributable to these activities vary from study to study, but all 
indicate upcoding and billing for services not rendered account for the majority of health care 
fraud. Foundation of Research and Education of AHIMA, Automated Coding Software: 
Development and Use to Enhance Anti-Fraud Activities, July, 2005, Page 8. 
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_031700.pdf (hereinafter 
“AHIMA coding report.”)   The AHIMA coding report concluded these schemes account for 77% 
of fraud, 43% for upcoding and 34% for billing for services not rendered. Id. In contrast, 
DataWatch, utilizing data from public and private payers, determined these schemes accounted 
for 56% of fraud, 22% for upcoding and 34% for billing for services not rendered. Datawatch, 
Health Insurance Fraud Busters, Business and Health, 2000, pg. 18. 
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allow physicians to paste a pre-programmed examination note with just one-click.
16
 For 
example, some systems allow the following to be entered into an EHR with just one-
click: “[t]he chest expansion is normal and symmetrical. There is no dullness to 
percussion. Both diaphragms move adequately. There are no rales, rhonchi, wheezes, 
egophony nor whispered pectoriloquy.”17 Some systems go even further, and allow 
physicians to create longer and more detailed notes that could cover extremely intricate 
examinations.
18
   
Whereas one-click notes are typically limited to certain common procedures, the 
potential for abuse of copy and paste features is almost limitless. A common scheme 
involves pasting the same examination findings for multiple patients, a practice known as 
cloning.
19
 However, cut and paste features can be abused even more subtlety when it is 
limited to the same patient’s record.  For example, consider a situation where a patient is  
hospitalized with an infection and the standard of care requires the patient be examined 
thoroughly each day to gauge the progress of treatment. By using the copy and paste 
feature, a physician can make it appear that the initial examination, which may have been 
very thorough and therefore entitled to a high billing code, was completed every day. 
However, in actuality, a much shorter examination was most likely completed after the 
initial examination. Anecdotal evidence suggests this type of fraud is exceedingly 
                                                        
16 Daniel Essin, The Ethical Dilemma Created by EHRs, Physicians Practice, June 18, 2012,  
http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/content/article/1462168/2083374 
17 Donald Simborg, Promoting Electronic Health Record Adoption: Is It the Correct Focus?, 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association,  2008, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2274790. 
18 Id.  For example, Medical Training Billing Corp. (MTBC), a web-based EHR company, offers 
an EHR system, ChartsProTM, that includes one-click notes that encompass entire exams  “for 
musculoskeletal, vascular, and lymphatic systems.” Medical Training Billing Corp., EHR 
Features, 2012, http://www.mtbc.com/ehr-features.aspx. 
19 Albeson, supra note 12. 
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common. For example, Robert E. Hirschtick, M.D., Associate Professor at Northwestern 
Medical School, noted that after EHR software was adopted at Northwestern “virtually 
all of  [the examination] notes are longer, recombinant versions of previous notes… 
Ideally, old information and diagnostic impressions are deleted and new ones added. In 
reality, however, there is no deletion, only additions.” 20 
Message prompts also contribute to the creation of false documentation in EHRs, but 
in a very different way than one-click notes or cut and paste features. In general, message 
prompts help physicians select the medical billing code that corresponds with the service 
provided and, in turn, determines the amount of reimbursement.
21
 While coding 
assistance is fine in and of itself, many prompts go too far and actively increase the ease 
of committing health care fraud by specifically advising physicians what documentation 
is required to justify higher billing codes.
22
 Typically, message prompts notify the 
physician if the billing code he or she entered is not justified by the current EHR 
documentation, and then advises how to reach the higher code. 
23
 However, some EHR 
                                                        
20 Robert Hirschtick, Copy and Paste, JAMA, 2006,  
http://courses.washington.edu/hmed665i/copyandpaste.pdf 
21 Rich Henriksen, Healthcare Coding, Billing & Reimbursement Overview, Healthcare 
Consulting, http://minneanalytics.org/files/Rich_Henriksen.pdf. 
22 While it could be argued that prompts do not increase the ease of committing fraud, since 
physicians intuitively know documentation for a more serious diagnosis carries a higher 
reimbursement, it should be emphasized that the delineations between billing codes can be 
extremely minute and are notoriously difficult to understand.  There are currently 17,000 different 
diagnosis codes and that number will increase to 144,000 when the ICD-10 billing requirements 
take effect on October 1, 2014.  Jennifer Bresnick, Q&A: ICD-10 Progress With Pat Schmitter, 
EHRIntelligence, November 7, 2012, http://ehrintelligence.com/2012/11/07/qa-icd-10-progress-
with-pat-schmitter. The use of prompts after that time will be extremely important to all 
physicians, whether they desire to upcode or not, since “ICD-10 will inherently bring to need for 
more specific documentation.” Lee Ford, Coding & Clinical Documentation Challenges of ICD-
10, North Carolina Health Information Management Assoc., June 24, 2010, 
www.nchima.org/smart05-bin/public/downloadlibrary?&itemid2307. 
23 Mildred L. Johnson, Electronic Medical Records Playbook, Texas Tech University Health 
Science Center Office of Billing Compliance, June 5, 2008,  http://www.ttuhsc.edu/elpaso/it/ 
documents/EMR_Playbook.pdf. 
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systems go even further and indicate how to reach higher codes even when the initial 
code entered by the physician was justified by the EHR documentation.
 24
 
Recent data suggests the potentialities of fraud discussed above have been realized in 
the areas of the country that have already adopted EHR systems. In September of 2012, 
the New York Times conducted a data analysis of Medicare claims that revealed 
hospitals with EHR systems are increasing their use of the highest billing codes.
25
 A 
particularly egregious example is Baptist Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee which 
submitted 82% of its claims at the highest level in the year after it adopted an EHR 
system.
 26
  Over all, hospitals that received government incentives to adopt EHRs showed 
a 47% rise in Medicare payments at higher levels from 2006 to 2010, compared to just a 
32% rise in hospitals that have not received government incentives.
27
 The Times’ 
findings were confirmed by the Center of Public Integrity (CPI) which conducted a 
similar data analysis of claims from 2001 to 2010.
 28
 The CPI found, “thousands of 
providers turned to more expensive billing codes…despite little evidence that Medicare 
patients as a whole are older or sicker than in past years.”29 While no one cause could be 
identified, CPI concluded, “higher billing rates appear to be associated with the use of 
                                                        
24  Id. Farzad Mostashari, the current National Coordinator for ONC, has recognized that prompts 
that suggest more documentation to reach a higher billing code “might be over the line.” Robert 
Lowes, Federal EHR Office to Look at Overbilling Allegations, Medscape Medical News, 
October 19, 2012, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/772944.  
25  Albeson, supra note 12. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Fred Schulte, Center Investigation Suggests Costs From Upcoding and Other  Abuses Likely 
Top $11 Billion, Center for Public Integrity, September 15, 2012, http://publicintegrity.org/2012 
/09/15/10810/how-doctors-and-hospitals-have-collected-billions-questionable-medicare-fees. 
29 Id. 
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medical records and billing software... which make it easy to create detailed patient files 
with just a few mouse clicks.”30 
While the initial data is admittedly limited, it has gotten the attention of the federal 
government. In a letter dated September 24, 2012, the Secretary of HHS Kathleen 
Sebelius and U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder advised the chief executive officers of 
five leading hospital associations that there are "troubling indications" that some 
providers are using EHRs to "game the system." 
31
 The letter reiterated the government’s 
commitment to catching fraudsters noting, “law enforcement will take appropriate steps 
to pursue health care providers who misused electronic health records.”32  While the letter 
serves as a strong warning, immediate federal action is required if the government hopes 
to slow down fraud attributable to EHRs.  For the policy reasons set forth in Part II, 
below, federal action should take the form of amending the certification regulations to 
require all EHR systems include fraud prevention software tools. 
II. POLICY ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT AMENDING THE CERTIFICATION 
REGULATIONS TO REQUIRE FRAUD PREVENTION TOOLS IN EHRS 
 
Before setting forth the policy reasons why the certification regulations should be 
amended, it is important to note that there is little doubt that the ONC has the statutory 
authority to make the changes this paper will advocate. Under 42 U.S.C.A 300jj-11(c)(5), 
the ONC is given the responsibility to “keep or recognize a program for the voluntary 
certification of health information technology.”33 Moreover, the ONC is given broad 
                                                        
30 Id. 
31 Letter from Obama Administration on Billing, September 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/  
/interactive/2012/09/25/business/25medicare-doc.html?ref=business. 
32 Id. 
33 The HHS news release announcing that the ONC had issued a final rule for EHR certification 
explicitly cites to this statutory section. “This final rule is issued under the authority provided to 
 9 
discretion in determining the underlying certification criteria under 42 U.S.C.A. 300jj-
14(b)(3) which states the ONC “shall adopt…implementation specifications and 
certification criteria as necessary.” Further, ONC leadership has previously recognized, 
through its words and official actions, that it has the ability to mandate fraud prevention 
tools in EHR systems. 
34
  
There are at least four policy arguments that support amending the federal 
certification regulations to mandate the inclusion of fraud prevention tools in EHRs. First, 
given the tremendous negative impact of fraud and abuse on the U.S health care system, a 
strong federal response is required to prevent further damage from the exploitation of 
EHR software. Second, the responsive tactics currently emphasized by the government 
are of limited effectiveness in combating health care fraud, and as such, more emphasis 
must be placed on proactive fraud prevention tactics like EHR fraud prevention tools. 
Third, data mining, the government’s primary proactive fraud prevention approach, 
cannot slow significantly slow down the increased fraud due to use of EHR software 
tools, and therefore, should be supplemented with more and diversified proactive 
approaches. Fourth, and finally, fraud prevention tools should be included in all EHRs 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology in section 3001(c)(5) of the Public 
Health Service Act (PHSA) as added by the HITECH Act.” HHS, ONC Issues Final Rule to 
Establish Certification Program for Electronic Health Record Technology, June 18, 2010, 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/06/20100618d.html. 
34  Dr. Simborg notes that shortly after the creation of the ONC it’s first National Coordinator, Dr. 
David Brailer, convened a panel of health law experts and posed to them the question, should the 
ONC “be neutral with regard to fraud or proactive in combating fraud?” See Simborg, supra note 
9. Further, the ONC subsequently commissioned a report prepared by RTI International whose 
sole purpose was to propose fraud prevention software tools.  While RTI’s suggestions were not 
adopted, its clear the ONC believed it had the ability to adopt such recommendations and further, 
none of the public comments received in response to the report questioned the ONC’s ability to 
adopt the recommendations. RTI International, Recommended Requirements for Enhancing Data 
Quality in Electronic Health Records. May 2007, http://www.rti.org/pubs/ehcancing_data_quality 
_in_ehrs.pdf. This report will be discussed extensively in Part III of this paper. 
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because not only will they ensure EHRs are not used to increase fraud, but if adequately 
designed, they can actively decrease all health care fraud.  
A. POLICY ARGUMENT 1: GIVEN THE TREMENDOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT OF 
FRAUD AND ABUSE ON THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, A STRONG FEDERAL 
RESPONSE IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE FROM THE 
EXPLOITATION OF EHR SOFTWARE. 
  
 Dr. Donald W. Simborg, the chairman of several federal panels that examined the 
potential for fraud in electronic health systems, compared fraud and abuse in the health 
care system to “doping and bicycling…[e]verybody knows it’s going on.”35  The 
statistics concerning the extent of fraud and abuse in the U.S. health care system can only 
be described as simply staggering. According to a 2008 study by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, (1) about $133 billion of all payments by CMS were 
distributed improperly due to the filing of illegitimate claims, (2) $50 billion in payments 
made by Blue Cross and Blue Shield were for fraudulent payments, and (3) $100 billion 
in other private or patient payments were for some form of improper billing.
36
 Based 
upon this conservative figure, $283 billion, the amount lost due to fraud and abuse in the 
U.S. each year towers over the GDP of Ireland, $218 billion. 
37
  
It is important to emphasize that health care fraud is not a victimless crime. The 
pervasiveness of fraud and abuse in the system contributes to the rising cost of health 
care, which places increased financial burdens on patients and employers alike.
38
 For 
                                                        
35 Albeson, supra note 12. 
36 Jeffrey Helton, Avoiding Fraud Risks Associated with EHRs, Health Financial Management 
Association, July 2010, http://www.mfrpc.com/Default.aspx?DN=f927c939-4f17-44ae-870d-
dcbaa978d59c. 
37  Trading Economics, Ireland GDP, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ireland/gdp. 
38 In 2006, the National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC) noted that “inappropriate care, waste 
and fraud” were major contributors to the rising cost of medical care and health insurance in the 
U.S.  National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC). Health Insurance Cost: Facts on the Cost of 
Health Care. 2007, http://www.nchc.org/facts/costs.html. 
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patients, this means having to pay higher insurance premiums, which many families are 
unable to do during the current economic recession.
39
 For employers, health care fraud 
increases the overall cost of doing business, and in some instances, has resulted in 
employers dropping insurance coverage altogether.
40
 Given this information, it is not 
surprising the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) has opined “[f]or 
many Americans, the increased expense resulting from fraud could mean the difference 
between making health insurance a reality or not.”41 
While increased health care costs are troublesome, what’s more disconcerting is that 
fraud and abuse can directly and adversely affect patient care for those who are already 
insured. 
42
 For example, consider a situation where a diagnostic note is included in a 
patient’s EHR solely to justify the use of a higher billing code. At first glance, the 
erroneous note appears to have no direct impact on the patient’s health. After all, the 
patient has already received care and is presumably on the road to recovery. However, it 
is important to remember that the erroneous note will remain in the patient’s EHR and, as 
such, could adversely affect future clinical decisions.
43
  Dr. Hirschtick, whose 
                                                        
39 National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, The Problem of Health Care Fraud, 
http://www.nhcaa.org/resources/health-care-anti-fraud-resources/the-problem-of-health-care-
fraud.aspx.   Unsurprisingly, lack of medical insurance directly impacts the health of patients. A 
study by Harvard University linked the lack of insurance to 45,000 death per year in the U.S.   
Reed Abelson, Harvard Medical Study Links Lack of Insurance to 45,000 U.S. Death a Year, 
N.Y. Times, September 17, 2009, http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/harvard-
medical-study-links-lack-of-insurance-to-45000-us-deaths-a-year. 
40   Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Unfortunately, there are numerous concrete examples of patients being harmed as a result of 
health care fraud and abuse.  One of the more egregious cases involves a Chicago cardiologist 
that performed over seven hundred and fifty medically unnecessary heart catherizations over a 
10-year fraud scheme that resulted in at least two deaths. The physician was eventually sentenced 
to federal prison in 2002. Bruce Japsen, Edgewater Doctor’s Sentence is 12 Years, Chicago 
Tribune, June 29, 2002, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-06-29/business/020629. 
43 In Money and Outpatient Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines from Accounts to Ethics, Cecilia M. 
Mikalac contends that the inclusion of a false diagnosis in a patient’s medical record can cause 
 12 
experiences with copying and pasting in EHRs were discussed in Part I, provides 
perspective on how easily a physician could be misled by an erroneous note. “The patient 
does seem fully coherent now, but the EMR says she’s demented and who are you going 
to believe, EMR or a demented patient?...everything in the EMR becomes true.” 44 
Patient care can be affected by fraud and abuse in even more subtle ways. For 
example, fraud and abuse can decrease the finite health insurance benefits available to 
already insured patients. 
45
 Patients who have private health insurance often have lifetime 
caps or other limits on benefits under their policies. Every time a claim is falsely paid in a 
patient's name, the dollar amount counts toward that patient's lifetime or other limits. 
46
 
This means that when a patient legitimately needs his or her insurance benefits the most, 
they may have already been exhausted. 
47
  
Given the tremendous impact of fraud on the health care system, a strong federal 
response is required to prevent further damage from the exploitation of EHR software.  
This paper advocates for the strongest conceivable federal response to this burgeoning 
problem by calling for amendments to the certifications regulations that will change the 
minimum requirements for each and every EHR system in the U.S.  It is important to 
emphasize that this growing problem should be addressed through federal action since 
                                                                                                                                                                     
societal harm as well by distorting the prevalence of certain diseases. She notes, “distorting 
diagnoses makes it difficult for governments and insurers to obtain accurate information for 
calculating current and future health care costs and skews statistics …about the prevalence of 
psychiatric illness.” Cecilia M. Mikalac, Money and Outpatient Psychiatry: Practice Guidelines 
from Accounts to Ethics, pg, 58, New York: W.W. Norton, 2005. 
44 Dr. Hirschtick, supra note 15. 
45  The Affordable Care Act (ACA) eliminates all annual and lifetime limits on health insurance 
benefits starting in 2014. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11.  
46 NCHC, supra note 38. 
47 Id. 
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health care fraud is truly a national problem.
48
  This is especially true with respect to 
upcoding, which as discussed previously, is one of primary types of fraud that is 
increased when EHR software is exploited. In September of 2012, CPI released a report 
that found physicians have billed Medicare at progressively higher rates over the past 
decade and concluded “a significant portion of the added charges are likely due to 
‘upcoding.’”49 CPI’s investigation revealed that the increased upcoding was among 
“thousands of doctors, from a broad range of specialties and locales.”50 Consistent with 
this assertion, when U.S. counties were ranked by percentage of claims submitted at the 
highest billing codes, the report found the 20 most aggressive coding counties were 
disbursed among 13 different states.
51
 
The government’s response to this vexing problem must not only be strong, but it 
must be immediate as well.  According to HHS estimates, the use of EHR systems will 
increase dramatically over the next few years. By 2015, 85% of hospitals will use EHR 
systems, as opposed to just 35% this year. Further, the use of EHRs by independent 
physicians is estimated to increase by approximately 25% within just the next year. 
52
 
The government must seize this opportunity to adequately secure EHR software through 
amendments to the certification regulations before the amount of fraud attributable to 
EHR software explodes even further.  
                                                        
48 Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), in discussing OIG’s experience with fraud in the Medicaid 
program  has noted, “it is perfectly clear from [OIG’s] narratives that fraud and abuse in the 
Medicaid program is not concentrated in any specific area. Rather, it is widespread throughout the 
entire program.” U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Grassley Urges More Attention to Medicaid 
Fraud, August 18, 2004, http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id 
=d0ca4434-add2-4213-92d9-9592925e931b. 
49 Schulte, supra note 27. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 HHS, Physicians Using EHR Technology, Express Positive Reviews, July 17, 2012, 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120717a.html. 
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B. POLICY ARGUMENT 2: THE RESPONSIVE TACTICS CURRENTLY 
EMPHASIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE OF LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS IN 
COMBATING HEALTH CARE FRAUD, AND AS SUCH, THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT MUST PLACE MORE EMPHASIZE ON PROACTIVE 
TACTICS, SUCH AS EHR FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOLS, TO 
CURB THE EXPLOITATION OF EHR SOFTWARE. 
 
 
Cesare Beccaria
53
 once famously wrote, “it is better to prevent crimes than to 
punish them. This is the fundamental principle of good legislation.”54 The reasoning 
behind Beccaria’s statement is quite obvious and inherently logical.  It is always 
preferable to avoid the negative consequences of bad behavior, if possible, than to hope 
to effectively deal with them after the fact.
55
  Curiously, the federal government has 
largely ignored preventative measures in its fight against health care fraud, even though, 
it  has relied heavily upon them to avoid other great harms to the country.
56
 Given the 
undeniable failure of the government’s responsive tactics in fighting health care fraud, 
and upcoding in particular, the federal government must shift its focus towards more 
proactive measures, such as fraud prevention software tools, to curb the exploitation of 
EHR systems. 
                                                        
53 Cesare Beccaria is a 18th century Italian philosopher whose writings, particularly On Crimes 
and Punishment, formed the basis for many modern criminology theories.   Dr. Cecil E. Greek, 
Criminological Theory: Cesare Beccaria, Florida State University,  November 22, 2005, 
http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/beccaria.htm. 
54 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, 1785, http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun4  
1.txt.   
55 “Most criminologists agree that it is far better to prevent crime in the first place than to allow it 
to happen and then invoke a criminal justice response to it.”  Quint Thurman, Community 
Policing, Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Pub., 1997.  
56  The most notable example would be the government’s approach to fighting terrorism. The 
USA Patriot Act provides law enforcement officers with tremendous latitude in surveying and 
detaining individuals in an effort to prevent acts of terrorism. Clearly, the U.S. government has 
made a concerted effort to prevent terrorism, as opposed to effectively dealing with the 
devastating consequences of terrorism after the fact. Likewise, in recognition of the tremendous 
harm caused by health care fraud, the government must place more emphasis on preventative 
measures.  
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Historically, the U.S. government has emphasized responsive approaches, such as 
post payment data-analysis, to identify fraud after the fact, and aggressive litigation to 
deter other dishonest health care providers from committing fraud.
57
  The government’s 
responsive tactics have proven to be of limited effectiveness. Studies indicate that only a 
tiny portion of health care fraud is identified through responsive tactics. A report 
prepared by the American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA) 
estimated that only three to ten percent of healthcare fraud is ever identified.
58
 William J. 
Rudman, PhD, a co-author of the AHIMA report, asserted, “we are probably only at the 
tip of the iceberg in terms of being able to identify…fraud.”59  Further, it takes years to 
discover the small portion of fraud that is actually uncovered through responsive tactics. 
Dr. Rudman noted that instances of fraud that are detected “only surface after years of 
aberrant data patterns raise a red flag.” 60 It can take years to identify fraud through 
responsive tactics even when a medical institution reviews its own records.  According 
to Dr. Rudman, “in big corporations, it may take four or five years to document cases of 
fraud.”61 
 When the government identifies fraud, severe financial penalties are typically 
levied against those who have abused the system. 
62
 The government loves to publicize 
                                                        
57  Dr. Simborg has opined “[w]hat we do now is pay and chase. You pay the bill and then do a 
pattern analysis to find outliers. Then a sting operation to recover maybe a million or billion 
dollars…This is a drop in the bucket. We are talking about a $250 billion problem.” Eramo, supra 
note 7. 
58 Foundation of Research and Education of AHIMA. A Study of Health Care Fraud and Abuse: 
Implications for Professionals Managing Health Information. Nov, 2010. Page 2. 
http://ahimafoundation.org/downloads/pdfs/Fraud%20and%20Abuse%20-%20final%2011-4-
10.pdf. 
59 Eramo, supra note 7. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62  A Department of Justice (DOJ) news release indicates the government obtained over $3 billion 
dollars in judgments and settlements in health care fraud and abuse cases in 2011. United States 
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the large amounts that have been recovered through fraud and abuse litigation,
63
 however,  
the amounts recovered pale in comparison to the financial damage done to the system.  
According to a Department of Justice (DOJ) press release, the federal government 
recovered $3 billion dollars in 2011 from judgments and settlements resulting from health 
care fraud investigations.
64
 While this figure is impressive in isolation, consider that $5 
billion is stolen from the system as a result of health care fraud every week. 
65
   
 While responsive tactics are generally ineffective in fighting all types of health 
care fraud, as the above figures demonstrate, they have proven particularly inept at 
counteracting upcoding and billing for services not rendered. Of the $3 billion recovered 
by the DOJ in 2011, the vast majority, $2.2 billion, came from improvident 
pharmaceutical companies.
66
 Therefore, comparatively little was recovered from health 
care professionals that commit health care fraud through upcoding and billing for services 
not rendered.
67
  What’s more, studies suggests that the small amount recovered from 
upcoding physicians each year is almost entirely attributable to whistleblowers coming 
forward rather than the federal government’s responsive investigative techniques. PCI’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
DOJ, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011, 
December 19, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html (hereafter 
“DOJ press release.”) 
63 There are no shortage of the examples of the government publicizing its large fraud and abuse 
monetary recoveries. The latest and most notable example came during the first Presidential 
debate of 2012 when President Obama proudly proclaimed, “we went after medical fraud in 
Medicare and Medicaid very aggressively, more aggressively than ever before, and have saved 
tens of billions of dollars, $50 billion of waste taken out of the system.” Presidential Debate 
Questions and Transcript (October 3, 2012),   http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/81991_ 
_Page4.html#ixzz29qJmqHrw. 
64 DOJ press release, supra note 62.  
65 It is estimated health care fraud results in $283 billion lost each year. This number, $283 
billion, divided by the amount of weeks in a year, 52, results in an average of  $5.4 billion stolen 
each week as a result of health care fraud. Helton, supra note 36. 
66 DOJ press release, supra note 62.  
67 This is significant since health care professionals commit 72% of all health care fraud. Thomas 
D. Musco, et. al., Health Insurers’ Anti-Fraud Programs, Health Insurance Association of 
America, 1999, http://www.claim.org/workshops_separate/00FC07.pdf.  
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September 2012 report, discussed above, specifically asserted the government “typically 
has no way of find out [about persistent upcoding] unless someone on the inside comes 
forward and alerts them.” 68 If responsive tactics cannot effectively curb upcoding and 
billing for services not rendered in general, there is absolutely no reason to believe such 
tactics will address the increased instances of these types of fraud that will result from the 
exploitation of EHR software.  
C. POLICY ARGUMENT 3: DATA MINING, THE PRIMARY PROACTIVE 
APPROACH BEING UTILIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT, CANNOT 
SIGNIFICANTLY SLOW FRAUD AND ABUSE BY ITSELF, AND THEREFORE, 
OTHER PROACTIVE APPROACHES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. 
 
Over the past few years, fraud prevention, as opposed to paying and chasing, has 
gained some traction in the federal government.
69
  Undoubtedly, data mining is the center 
piece of the government’s initial shift toward more proactive fraud tactics. 70 Data mining 
is a pattern discovery process that relies upon large volumes of data to infer meaningful 
patterns and relationships between data items.
71
 Roughly stated, the purpose of data 
                                                        
68 Schulte, supra note 47. 
69 HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius stated on March 15, 2011, during the joint HHS / DOJ 
Detroit Fraud Prevention Summit, that HHS is moving away from the “old pay and chase model.” 
Detroit Fraud Prevention Summit, HHS, March 15, 2011, http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about 
/speeches/sp20110315.html. 
70  Robert Radick, a Forbes Magazine contributor, has noted that the use of data mining has 
become the “bread and butter” of the federal government’s fight against health care fraud. Robert 
Radick, Claims Data and Health Care Fraud: The Controversy Continues, Forbes, September 25, 
2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/09/25/claims-data-and-health-care-fraud-the-
controversy-continues.  Two recent developments are noteworthy. In 2011, the federal 
government passed regulations that allow State Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MCFUs) to seek 
federal funds to start data mining Medicaid claims. See CFR 1007.19(e)(2). In an even more 
aggressive approach, the government recently began to use revamped data-mining technology to 
predict and identify potentially fraudulent Medicare claims to help stop fraudulent claims before 
they are paid. Fierce HealthIT, New Technology To Help Fight Medicare Fraud, June 22, 2011, 
http://www.fiercehealthit.com/press-releases/new-technology-help-fight-medicare-fraud. 
71 Guisseppi A. Forgionne et. al., An Intelligent Data Mining System to Detect Health Care 
Fraud, page 152, January 1, 2000, http://www.igi-global.com/chapter/intelligent-data-mining-
system-detect/9223. 
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mining is to extract useful information from data using complex algorithms.
72
 In the 
health care context, the goal of data mining is to significantly decrease health care fraud 
by uncovering fraudulent billing practices. However, there are several factors that suggest 
the government is unlikely to obtain far reaching success with data mining as its sole 
proactive approach.
73
  
First, as a preliminary matter, it is important to note that data mining is a relatively 
new developed methodology and technology, coming into prominence only in 1994.
74
 As 
such, some suggest there is a lack of published well-researched methods and algorithms 
in any context, let alone the complex health care environment, for this approach to be 
successful over the long term.
75
 Even if the most beneficial algorithms are currently in 
place, the government is not guaranteed long-term success with this approach since any 
data mining initiative must continually adapt to changing circumstances to remain 
successful.
 76
  As time goes by, fraudsters will change their behaviors in response to the 
current algorithms.
77
 Tom Fawcett, a respected data mining scholar, has noted “[w]ithin 
the near future after uncovering the current modus operandi of professional fraudsters, 
                                                        
72 Frank Cohen, Data Mining As An Audit Tool, Health Care Finance News, July 6, 2011, 
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/data-mining-audit-tool. 
73 Louis Saccoccio, CEO of National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, recently testified 
before Congress and advocated strongly for a diversified approach to fraud prevention. “Health 
care fraud takes many forms and is a serious problem regardless of the mode of health care 
delivery. Similarly, anti-fraud efforts must be multi-faceted, as there is no single solution to this 
problem.” Statement of Louis Saccoccio before U.S. House of Representatives, Energy and 
Commerce Committee, November 28, 2012,  http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans. 
energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/Health/20121128/HHRG-112-IF14-WState-
SaccoccioL-20121128.pdf. 
74 Gerald Tan et. al., Data Mining Applications in Health Care, Journal of Health Information 
Management, http://www.himss.org/content/files/jhim/19-2/datamining.pdf. 
75 Clifton Phua, A Comprehensive Survey of Data-Mining Fraud Detection Research. Artificial 
Intelligence Review, 2005, http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1009/1009.6119.pdf. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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these same fraudsters will continually supply new or modified styles of fraud until the 
detection systems start generating false negatives again.” 78 
Even assuming the government adequately deals with this issue, there are still serious 
doubts as to whether there is reliable medical data to analyze.  Medicaid claims data in 
particular has come under intense scrutiny, and high-ranking governmental officials have 
recognized the unreliability of such data. For example, in June of this year, HHS 
Regional Inspector General Ann Maxwell recently acknowledged to the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that much of the Medicaid data that is 
mined and analyzed to identify overpayments and fraud is not “current, available, 
complete, [or] accurate.” 79 Regional Inspector General Maxwell concluded, “[t]he poor 
quality of the Medicaid data…hindered their ability to efficiently detect suspicious trends 
in Medicaid claims for further auditing or investigation.” 80 
The initial data suggests that data mining is not having as significant of an impact as 
originally hoped. In 2011, federal regulations were passed that permit State Medicaid 
Fraud Control Units (MCFUs) to seek federal funds to start data mining.
81
 Florida’s 
MCFU was the first state entity to obtain federal funding.
82
 In its first 8 months of 
                                                        
78 Id. 
79 Assessing Medicare and Medicaid Program Integrity, Testimony of: Ann Maxwell Regional 
Inspector General Office of Inspector General (OIG) of HSS, June 7, 2002,  
https://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2012/Maxwell_testimony_06072012%20.pdf. 
80 Id. 
81 See CFR 1007.19(e)(2). 
82 HHS, HHS Announces New Tool to Help Fight Health Care Fraud in Florida, July 15, 2010, 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100715a.html. 
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utilizing data mining technology, the state’s efforts only resulted in 2 court cases and 18 
complaints opened. 
83
   
Perhaps it is too early to pass judgment on Florida’s efforts, but even in more 
established data mining programs, the results are far from over whelming. For example, 
consider the Medicare-Medicaid Data Match Program (frequently referred to as the 
“Medi-Medi Project.”) The Medi-Medi project combines Medicare and Medicaid claims 
and then utilizes computer algorithms to search for payment anomalies.
84
  The program 
started in 2001 in California, and has slowly expanded to other portions of the country. 
85
  
In 2007, when the program was in operation in 10 states, the Chief Financial Officer of 
CMS at the time, Timothy B. Hill, asserted, “to date…$15 million in overpayments have 
been referred for collection, and $25 million in improper payments have been denied 
before payment was made.”86  The paltry amounts recovered, in comparison to the billion 
stolen each year, suggest the federal government should utilize a more diversified 
approach that includes different types of proactive tactics, such as fraud prevention 
software tools, in order to address the increase of fraud through exploitation of EHR 
systems. 
D. POLICY ARGUMENT 4: FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOLS SHOULD 
BE REQUIRED IN ALL EHRS BECAUSE THEY CAN NOT ONLY ADDRESS 
THE PROBLEM OF INCREASED FRAUD DUE TO ABUSE OF EHR TOOLS,  
THEY CAN DECREASE ALL HEALTH CARE FRAUD.  
                                                        
83 Florida Agency for Health Care Administration Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Department of 
Legal Affairs,  The State’s Efforts to Control Medicaid Fraud and Abuse FY 2010-2011.  Page 9, 
http://ahca.myfloria.com/Executive/Inspector_General/docs. 
2010_11_Fraud_and_Abuse_Annual_Report.pdf. 
84 Kathy Giannangelo, Mining Medicare and Medicaid Data to Detect Fraud, Journal of AHIMA, 
July 2007, http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/docuents/ahima/bok1_034462.  
85 Id. 
86 Statement of Timothy B. Hill, Chief Financial Officer (CMS) on Medicare Program Integrity 
before Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2007,  
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/03/t20070308g.html. 
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Health care fraud is not a homogenous crime. It is committed by a number of 
different perpetrators whom utilize varied fraudulent schemes.
87
 Therefore, admittedly, 
the problem is unlikely to be completely eliminated by any singular proactive approach. 
However, fraud prevention software tools could become the strongest tool in combating 
health care fraud because they can not only prevent abuse of EHR tools, but, if properly 
designed, they can also help decrease all instances of health care fraud.  
Studies indicate health care professionals commit the majority of health care fraud, 
72%,
88
 and that this fraud is most commonly perpetrated through either upcoding or 
billing for services not rendered.
89
 As noted in Part I, EHR software includes several 
timesaving tools that increase the speed and ease of committing these specific types of 
fraud. Fraud prevention tools could be designed to make sure these tools are not abused. 
However, there is no reason why fraud tools have to be limited to ensuring EHR features 
do not increase the problem of upcoding and billing for services not rendered in the 
electronic setting. If properly designed, EHR software could help eliminate these 
problems altogether. 
A simple example helps demonstrate this point.  To address the problem of billing 
for services not rendered, EHRs could require advanced identity authentication at the 
point of care, such as a biometric thumbprint scan, to ensure a medical examination has 
actually taken place. 
90
 This requirement would ensure that EHR tools, such as one-click 
                                                        
87 While health care fraud commonly involves doctors billing for services not rendered or 
upcoding, non-health care providers commit nearly 30% of fraud each year.  Musco, supra note 
67.  
88  Id. 
89 AHIMA coding report, supra note 15. 
90 Eramo, supra note 7.  This fraud prevention software tool is examined further in Part III. 
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notes, cannot be used to help create a false record that can then be used to bill for services 
not rendered. However, this requirement would not only ensure that EHR software tools 
are not abused, it would also actively decrease all instances of this type of fraud. If a 
unique thumbprint is required, health care professionals cannot create a record for a visit 
out of thin air regardless of whether they would have used EHR software tools to increase 
the speed and ease of doing so. As the above example demonstrates, EHR software is 
sufficiently malleable to transform it from a tool that increases fraud to a tool that 
actively deters it. 
 
III. FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 In 2007, RTI International published a report entitled Recommended 
Requirements for Enhancing Data Quality in Electronic Health Records. 
91
 The report’s 
primary focus was to identify requirements for EHR systems that would “prevent fraud 
from occurring, as well as detect fraud both prospectively and retrospectively.”92 The 
report set forth fourteen distinct functional requirements.
93
 While the ONC commissioned 
the report, its functional requirements were framed as non-binding “recommendations to 
                                                        
91 RTI International, supra note 13. 
92 Id. at ES-2. 
93 RTI’s recommendations are grouped into the following fourteen distinct functional 
requirements: (1) audit functions and features, (2) provider identification, (3) user access 
authorization, (4) documentation process issues, (5) evaluation and management (E&M) coding, 
(6) proxy authorship, (7) record modification after signature, (8) auditor access to patient record, 
(9) EHR traceability, (10) patient involvement in anti-fraud, (11) patient identity-proofing, (12) 
structured and coded data, (13) integrity of EHR transmission, and (14) accurate linkage of claims 
to clinical records. Id. at 4-1. Each of the aforementioned requirements has several distinct parts 
and therefore, it is probably more accurate to state RTI recommended over 60 EHR systems 
requirements. Id. at 4-6 to 4-17. 
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the industry”94 and subsequently ignored when the certification regulations were 
passed.
95
   
 Fraud prevention tools hold tremendous promise and should be required in all 
EHR systems. However, these tools must be designed with an eye towards the risks 
associated with EHR systems if they are going to be effective. As noted, the abuse of 
EHR software leads to increased instances of upcoding and billing for services not 
rendered. Therefore, the certifications regulations must include several tools that are 
specifically designed to prevent these types of fraud. However, the regulations must also 
consider the effect each tool will have on the delivery of care because, while fraud is a 
tremendous problem, the majority of physicians do not commit health care fraud.
 96
 The 
certification regulations must strike a delicate balance. The government did not 
encourage the adoption of EHR’s for its own sake, but rather with hopes of promoting a 
system that is more efficient in all facets, including the delivery of care.
97
 Therefore, 
fraud prevention tools must be specifically designed to prevent fraud without stripping 
EHR systems of the timesaving capabilities that made them appealing in the first place.  
 Below, this paper recommends three fraud prevention tools that were initially 
advocated by RTI in its 2007 report. The first two recommendations, the regulation of 
message prompts and use of biometric identification, are specifically designed to prevent 
upcoding and billing for services not rendered. The third recommendation, which 
increases the auditing capability of payers, is designed to prevent the payment of 
                                                        
94 Id. at ES-2. 
95 See generally Eramo, supra note 7.  The certification regulation provisions, supra note 7. 
96 The NHCAA has opined “[t]he majority of health care fraud is committed by a very small 
minority of dishonest health care providers.” NHCAA, supra note 39. 
97 “Electronic health record systems are the key to the transformation of healthcare…widespread 
use has the potential to improve the quality of care, increase patient safety, reduce medical errors, 
and control health care costs.” Id. at ES-1. 
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fraudulent claims should other fraud prevention tools not prevent the creation of a false 
record. Although these recommendations vary greatly in their approach, they all have the 
benefit of not impeding the timesaving tools that make EHR software beneficial to the 
majority of physicians who do not abuse the system. The certification regulations should 
be immediately amended so that these fraud prevention tools are required in all EHR 
systems. 
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: THE CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS SHOULD REQUIRE 
ALL EHRS HAVE MESSAGE PROMPTS THAT: (1) ADVISE A PHYSICIAN IF THE 
SELECTED BILLING CODE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ENCOUNTER NOTE 
DOCUMENTATION, AND (2) DO NOT SUGGEST WHAT ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED TO UTILIZE A HIGHER BILLING CODE. 
 
RTI’s fifth functional requirement addressed message prompts in EHR software. RTI 
recommended that all EHR systems should prompt a physician when the billing code 
entered is inconsistent with the documentation in the encounter notes.
98
 Further, RTI 
recommended that EHR software not suggest what documentation is required to reach a 
higher billing code.
99
 These interrelated requirements should be included in the 
regulations because they address the problem of upcoding head on. 
Some studies suggest upcoding accounts for nearly half of all health care fraud,
 100
 
and as previously discussed, the exploitation of EHR software tools leads to an increase 
in this type of fraud. As such, the certifications regulations must include fraud prevention 
tools that curb this activity. Each part of this recommendation aggressively addresses the 
problem of upcoding.  First, explicitly advising physicians when a billing code is 
inconsistent with note documentation prevents upcoding by simultaneously deterring 
                                                        
98 RTI International, supra note 13 at 4-11. 
99 Id. 
100  AHIMA coding report, supra note 15. 
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fraudsters
101
 intending to upcode and educating honest physicians on proper billing 
practices to avoid unintentional upcoding. The prompt serves as a strong deterrent 
because fraudsters are immediately be put on notice that their billing practices are 
questionable and likely to alert the attention of the authorities. Further, all physicians 
would attain a tremendous educational benefit from the prompts because it would provide 
physicians with immediate feedback concerning their coding practices.
102
  
 Second, message prompts should not suggest how to reach higher billing codes to 
ensure that EHR software does not actively entice upcoding.
103
  Going forward, the 
certification regulations must be developed with an eye towards the fact that software 
developers have a strong incentive to include tools that make it exceedingly easy to 
upcode.
104
   In order to prosper, software developers must demonstrate to physicians that 
their products will result in a return on investment. To do so, software companies have 
pitched physicians on the ability of their products to increase income through the use of 
                                                        
101  The prompt would serve as an even greater deterrent to upcoding if it prevented the physician 
from submitting the claim at all when an inconsistent code is entered. This drastic approach could 
be entertained if more measured tactics do not slow the upcoding epidemic.  
102  Physicians have consistently sought clarification from CMS concerning proper coding 
practices.  In a letter addressed to HHS and the DOJ, the Association of Academic Health Centers 
(AAHC) noted “clarification of evaluation and management services coding has been a priority 
for AAHC, and we are ready and willing to with (CMS) and our members to address this issue.” 
AAHC Responds to HHS and DOJ Letter; Calls for Clarification on Guidance, September 25, 
2012, http://www.aahcdc.org/Policy/PressReleases/PRView/ArticleId/112/AAHC-RESPONDS-
TO-HHS-AND-DOJ-LETTER-CALLS-FOR-CLARIFICATION-ON-GUIDANCE.aspx 
103 It is particularly important that EHR software does not entice physicians to upcode since 
physicians already have such a strong financial incentive to do so.  Studies show that “raising the 
[billing] code by a single level on two patients a day can increase a doctor’s income by more than 
$15,000 over the course of a year and is not likely to raise suspicions.” Fred Schulte, Judgment 
Calls on Billing Make ‘Upcoding’ Prosecutions Rare, The Center for Public Integrity, September 
15, 2012, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/15/10835/judgment-calls-billing-make-
upcoding-prosecutions-rare. 
     physicians commit fraud. The AHIMA noted, “there is unintended incentive for fraud 
because…software developers need to prove a return on investment for the coding products. This 
issue must be considered in fraud prevention activities.”  AHIMA coding report, supra note 15 at 
pg. 22. 
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higher codes.
105
  Ross Kopel, a sociology professor at the University of Pennsylvania, 
observed that EHR software sales agents stress how the machines help doctors document 
the work they do, but “everybody knows there is a wink, wink behind that [with an 
underlying understanding that software] will help … make the patient’s visit look more 
involved than it is…[and] generate additional revenue.”106  In recognition of the strong 
financial incentive software developers have to develop easily abused software, it is 
imperative that the certification regulations prohibit tools, such as higher billing code 
prompts, that entice physicians to upcode.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: THE CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS SHOULD REQUIRE  
ADVANCED PATIENT IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION AT THE POINT OF CARE 
BEFORE PERMITTING A PHYSICIAN TO ENTER AN EXAMINATION NOTE. 
 
Regulating EHR message prompts, in the ways discussed above, would create a 
strong deterrent to upcoding. To adequately address the other primary type of fraud 
increased through the exploitation of EHRs, billing for services not rendered, the 
certification regulations must place a heavy burden on providers to demonstrate a medical 
encounter has actually occurred. This can be accomplished by requiring that EHR 
systems identify patients through the use of a biometric thumb scan at the point of care.
107
 
In order to prevent all billing for services not rendered, EHR software should do 
more than simply record that a patient’s identity has been verified, as was suggested by 
                                                        
105 EHR software companies make it clear that the use of higher coding levels could help 
physicians obtain a small fortune. For example, one manufacturer predicts a rise of one coding 
level for each patient visit, which it said could add up to $225,000 over the course of a year. 
Another cites a medical journal report that notes a medical practice in Utah produced an average 
billable gain of $26 per patient visit. Schulte, supra note 9. 
106 Id. 
107 Eramo, supra note 7; Ken Congdon, Are Biometrics the Key to Health IT Security?, 
Healthcare Technology Online, May 20, 2010, http://www.heatlhcaretechnologyonline.com/doc. 
mvc/Are-Biometrics-The-Key-To-Health-IT-Security-0001. 
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RTI in its report.
 108
 Instead, the software should go further and require advanced identity 
authentication before allowing the physician to take any action, such as enter an 
examination note. By requiring identity authentication first, all instances of billing for 
services not rendered would be decreased, as explained in Part II.D, and importantly, 
none of the EHR time-savings tools would be impaired. As noted above, it is important 
that the certification regulations adopt requirements that can combat fraud, and at the 
same time, do not hinder the tools that make the provision of care more efficient through 
use of EHRs. This requirement does not hamper any of the EHRs timesaving tools, and 
could actually make the entire physician office experience more efficient.  As explained 
by Ken Congdon:
109
 
 
After an initial scan, the identifying characteristics in the scan can be linked to the 
patient's record. In every subsequent visit, the patient will no longer have to go 
through the lengthy registration process (i.e. filling out paper work, submitting an 
insurance card, etc.). Instead, all of this data can be automatically populated based 
on the stored information linked to the biometric scan.
110
 
 
 In addition to curbing billing for services not rendered, this requirement would 
also help eliminate medical identity theft, one of the fastest growing types of health care 
fraud.
111
 Medical identity theft most commonly occurs when a person uses someone 
                                                        
108 RTI’s eleventh functional requirement, patient-identity proofing, suggested EHRs systems be 
able to  “document/record that identity-proofing was completed and the method used to verify.” 
RTI International, supra note 13 at 4-14. 
109  Mr. Congdon is the Editor-in-Chief of Healthcare Technology Online.  
110 Congdon, supra note 107.  
111 RTI, supra note 13 at 4-14.  A 2011 study conducted by the Ponemon Institute estimated the 
annual economic impact of medical identity theft to be $30.9 billion. Ponemon Institute, Second 
Annual Survey on Medical Identity Theft, Page 1, March 2011, 
https://www.protectmyid.com/images/education_center/pdf/050TypesofFraud/1_types%20of%20
fraud_medical%20study.PDF 
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else’s medical record to obtain medical goods or services.112 In 2010, 1.42 million 
Americans were the victims of medical identity theft. 
113
 In addition to defrauding payers, 
medical identity theft can adversely affect patient care. “When a victim’s records are 
merged with a thief using the same identity… that record becomes ‘polluted,’ and the 
victim may be…misdiagnosed based on this inaccurate information.”114 According to a 
2011 report conducted by the Ponemon Institute, 15% of medical identity theft ultimately 
results in either mistreatment or misdiagnosis of illness.
115
  
 While there is little doubt that biometric identification can be a powerful fraud 
prevention tool, the use of biometrics raises privacy concerns for many.
116
 Privacy 
advocates express particular concern over the consequences that could result from the 
unauthorized distribution of such sensitive information. Chris Dunn, associate legal 
director at the New York Civil Liberties Union, has opined “anytime you surrender 
private information like DNA, fingerprints, iris scans or palm prints, you need to 
understand that the information can be stored in a database, distributed to the world and 
used in ways you never intended.”117  However, those in the biometrics industry contend 
such views are misguided and the product of media depictions of biometrics that “do not 
                                                        
112 Rick Kam, A Glimpse Inside the $234 Billion World of Medical Fraud, Government HealthIT, 
http://www.govhealthit.com/news/glimpse-inside-234-billion-world-medical-id-theft. 
113 Ponemon, supra note 111. 
114 Kam, supra note 112. 
115 Ponemon, supra note 111 at pg. 8. 
116 According to a survey conducted by the Citizen and Immigration Canada (CIC), 48% of 
respondents expressed privacy concerns over the use biometric technology. Andrew Patrick, 
Societal Aspects of Biometrics, Institute for Information Technology, February 1, 2003, 
http://zing.ncsl.nist.gov/biousa/docs/bcc/BCC%20Societal%20Aspects%20of%20Biometrics%20
v06.pdf.   
117 Kathleen Lucadamo, NYU Hospital Scans Palms to Track Patients Without IDs, NY Daily 
News, July 25, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-07-25/local/29831318_1_patient-
safety-palm-scans. 
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accurately depict biometric technology, and leave [viewers] with ill conceived 
perceptions about the technology actually works.”118 
 A review of how biometric technology identifies patients confirms that privacy 
concerns are largely unwarranted.
119
 When a patient’s thumb is initially scanned by a 
biometric device, the patient’s biometric data is instantly converted into an otherwise 
unrelated data-string.
120
  It is this data-string, and not an image of the patient’s 
thumbprint, that is retained and used to verify the patient’s identity. In fact, since the 
patient’s thumbprint is instantly converted, a physical image of the patient’s fingerprint is 
never stored or transmitted across a network.
 121
  Furthermore, “it is nearly impossible to 
reverse engineer the [data-string] and successfully ‘steal’ [or re-create a patient’s] 
biometric identity.” 122 Even assuming the data string could be reversed engineered to re-
create an image of the patient’s thumbprint, the image would most likely be useless to a 
potential identity thief since most biometric systems do not associates data-strings with 
                                                        
118 Jeff Carter, Misinformation About Biometric Technology Continues to Fuel Functionality 
Misconceptions, M2SYS Biometric Technology, November 19, 2010, 
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patient names.
123
 As the above discussion makes clear, biometric technology has 
advanced to a point where the chance of unauthorized distribution of biometric data has 
been all but eliminated. As such, privacy concerns should not prevent the implementation 
of biometric identification in all EHR systems. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 3:  THE CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS SHOULD PERMIT 
PAYERS TO HAVE READ-ONLY ACCESS TO A PATIENT’S ENTIRE EPISODE OF 
CARE. 
 
RTI’s eighth functional requirement addressed the auditing capabilities of EHRs.124 
RTI recommended that EHR systems allow payers read-only access to a patient’s entire 
episode of care, as opposed to only each individual visit.
125
 This recommendation should 
be included in the certification regulations because it will increase the information 
available to payers, and therefore, increase their ability to detect fraud as soon as possible 
after payment is made or, ideally, before payment is made.  
 Payers need adequate information in order to detect fraud. In its report, RTI noted 
that it is exceedingly difficult to detect fraud before payment is made due to the scant 
amount of information typically available to payers. “Detection of a fraudulent claim is 
often difficult when a payer has access only to EHR information for a single 
encounter.”126 As RTI notes, it is quite logical that “[r]eviewing information over an 
entire episode of care for a single patient [would result in] greater ability to detect 
fraud.”127 In recognition of the tremendous amount of damage being done by health care 
                                                        
123 “9.9 times out of 10 biometric systems do not associate names with a biometric template so 
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fraud, the regulations must allow for those in the best position to prevent fraud to have 
ample information to detect it. 
 While the hope is that software fraud tools will prevent the exploitation of EHR 
software tools, it will be admittedly difficult to craft tools to combat every single way the 
software can exploited. This requirement recognizes this fact and adds another layer of 
protection by giving payers a real chance to prevent fraudulent payments, and the many 
harms that flow there from. Beyond preventing payment of fraudulent claims, this 
requirement has the added benefit of not impeding delivery of care. The goal is to 
implement software protections that combat fraud without negatively impacting the 
majority of care that is unaffected by health care fraud. This requirement undoubtedly 
furthers this goal. 
While this requirement has obvious advantages, it was controversial to privacy 
advocates.
128
 Deborah Peel, head of the Patient Privacy Rights Foundation, when asked 
about this requirement opined, “[it] proposes to violate every American’s health privacy 
to detect health care fraud.” 129 The privacy concerns associated with this requirement are 
overstated and should not prevent its inclusion in the certification regulations.  
There is no doubt that privacy is an issue that is important to many patients,
 130
 and 
should be an important consideration in shaping EHR fraud prevention tools. This 
requirement represents a measured approach that respects patient privacy. First, it must 
                                                        
128 See generally Joseph Conn, Vendors, Privacy Actvisits Speak Out on Report, Modern 
Healthcare, August 24, 2007, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20070824/INFO/308240 
01/1029/FREE. 
129 Id. 
130 In a Gallup survey commissioned by the Institute for Health Freedom, 78% of sampled adults 
said it was very important that their medical records be kept confidential. The Gallup 
Organization, Public Attitudes Towards Medical Privacy, Page 2, September 2000, 
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be emphasized that this requirement only grants payers access to information they have 
already viewed. By allowing payers access to an entire episode of care, the payer is in 
reality simply reviewing prior related bills for consistency. As such, this requirement 
makes it quicker and easier for the payer to detect fraud, yet, does not require patients to 
reveal new additional information in the process.  
Further, this requirement represents a truly measured approach in that it limits 
payer access to identifiable episodes of care, and therefore, specifically excludes access 
to the patient’s entire EHR. In many instances, payers will receive the same exact 
information that they normally would. For example, if the patient’s current visit is 
unrelated to any prior medical issues or visits, such as a visit related to the seasonal flu, 
that singular visit constitutes the entire episode of care and, as such, the payer only 
receives information pertaining to that visit. This requirement does not attempt to “violate 
every American’s health privacy” as Ms. Peel suggests. It simply asks patients to give up 
just a slither of privacy to help protect a system on the brink. The benefits of this 
requirement fair outweigh any privacy concerns and, as such, should be included in the 
certification regulations. 
 
IV.  CRITICISMS TO FRAUD PREVENTION SOFTWARE TOOLS 
 
 Although RTI’s specific software tool recommendations were not adopted, the 
public comments to their report indicated strong public support for the proposal of 
fighting fraud by securing EHR software.
131
 Those critical of RTI’s report primarily 
focused upon concerns that arose from RTI’s specific recommendations, and not the 
                                                        
131 RTI International, supra note 13, at 4.2 (“The comments supplied indicate general support for 
combating fraud in electronic HIE systems.”) In fact, the majority of responses received during 
the public comments period supported each recommendation made by RTI. Id. 
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general approach of fraud prevention software tools.
132
  That being said, it is likely that 
the federal government and civil liberty groups will oppose the use of fraud software 
tools, albeit for very different reasons. 
It is foreseeable that some in the Obama Administration will oppose fighting 
fraud through the use of software tools for fear of physician backlash.   By all accounts, 
RTI’s 2007 proposal was “totally ignored for fear of a physician backlash.”133 Dr. Robert 
Kolodner, a physician who headed the federal push for EHRs in 2007, acknowledged that 
fraud prevention took a backseat to steps likely to entice the medical community to 
embrace the new technology.
134
  
The possibility of physician backlash is no longer a viable reason for the federal 
government to delay implementation of aggressive fraud prevention tools in EHRs. While 
enticing physicians to adopt EHR software is a laudable goal, it must be remembered that 
EHR adoption is not the ultimate goal.
135
 If the amount of fraud in the system explodes 
due to use of EHR software, the desired goals of EHR adoption, mainly a more efficient 
and cost-effective health care system, may never be realized. Further, the government has 
already put in place policies that should sufficiently entice EHR adoption. Under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), physicians can 
receive significant financial payments if they display meaningful use of EHRs.
 136
 
Further, the incentive to adopt EHR technology will increase tremendously in 2015 when 
                                                        
132  Criticisms to the specific fraud tools recommended by this paper were addressed in Part III.  
133 Schulte, supra note 9. 
134 Id.  
135 “[The] goal is not adoption alone but ‘meaningful use’ of EHRs — that is, their use by 
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Use” Regulation for Electronic Health Records, The New England Journal of Medicine, August 
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 34 
the government will start penalizing those that do not utilize EHRs. 
137
 The excuses of the 
past must be abandoned so that the full benefits of EHRs can be realized.
 
 
 In addition to opposition from the government, it also likely fraud prevention 
tools will arise concerns in civil liberties advocates. Fraud software tools represent an 
aggressive preventative approach to combating the exploitation of EHR systems. In 
recent years, there has been a public outcry against overly aggressive preventative 
policing measures. Specifically, there have been a number of demonstrations protesting 
what have been dubbed “preemptive law enforcement measures,” wherein the 
government uses available information to predict who will commit certain offenses and 
then aggressively intervenes to prevent the commission of a crime.
138
 A commonly used, 
and often criticized, preemptive law enforcement measure is “stop and frisk” which 
essentially permits law enforcement officers to detain and search anyone they consider 
suspicious.
139
 Advocates argue “preemptive law enforcement [is] not only an oxymoron, 
but…[it] violates a number of civil rights.”140 Such measures are usually opposed on the 
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grounds they violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.
141
  
 Preemptive law enforcement critics raise valid concerns, however, these concerns 
should not prevent adoption of the proposal set forth in this paper since fraud prevention 
software tools do not represent a truly preemptive law enforcement measure. Preemptive 
law enforcement involves measures, such as “stop and frisk,” that involve either the 
detainment of an individual, or at the very least, some sort of actual police intervention, 
including surveillance, prior to the commission of a crime. Fraud prevention tools, in 
contrast, simply add protections to EHRs so they are not used to commit illegal ends. 
Fraud software tools do not involve police intervention or surveillance, quite to the 
contrary, these measures seek to remove the need of law enforcement by making it 
impossible to misuse EHR software tools.  As such, fraud prevention tools raise no 
constitutional concerns. Since, as the above discussion demonstrates, the concerns 
associated with fraud prevention software are largely unwarranted, the certification 
regulations should be amended to mandate their inclusion in all EHR systems. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The federal government has taken bold steps to ensure that EHRs are a focal part 
of the U.S. health care system. EHRs promise better patient care, increased efficiency, 
and reduced health care costs. In short, EHRs may hold the key to a brighter future for 
U.S. health care.  However, the same features of EHRs that engender hope, also cast a 
dark ominous shadow on the future. EHR software tools increase the speed of health care 
delivery, yet also provide dishonest health care professionals with almost endless 
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opportunities to game the system and increase the widespread damage caused by health 
care fraud.  
 To protect the future of the U.S. health care system, the federal government must 
amend the certification regulations to mandate the inclusion of fraud prevention tools in 
EHR software.  Fraud prevention tools will not only ensure that EHRs do not increase the 
amount of fraud in the system, but if designed properly, they can significantly eliminate 
all instances of health care fraud. The fraud tools should strive to address upcoding and 
billing for services not rendered, which account for the vast majority of health care fraud, 
and are the types of fraud most likely to increase through the exploitation of EHR 
systems. Requiring identity authentication at the point of care and putting strong controls 
on message prompts, recommended in Part III of this paper, would go along way in 
preventing these problems. Conversely, permitting payers read only access to a patient’s 
entire episode of care would go along way in detecting these problems if dishonest health 
care professionals somehow find a wrinkle in the system. With immediate and 
appropriate action, the future with EHRs is still bright.  
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